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BOOK REVIEW
MAINE CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE, 2ND EDITION
by James B. Zimpritch, Esq.
(Standish, Maine: Tower Publishing, 2004, pp. 646, $145.00)
Reviewed by George F Eaton, 11, and Kristy M. Smith
I. BACKGROUND
In 2001, several members of the Business Law Section of the Maine Bar As-
sociation convened the Corporate Law Revision Committee (the Committee), which
set out to adapt the Model Business Corporation Act1 (the Model Act) for use in
Maine. Maine's corporation law had not benefited from a comprehensive over-
haul since 1971, and notwithstanding periodic updates of specific components of
the statutory regime over the years, a thorough and comprehensive revision was
needed to keep pace with modem corporate law and practice in the twenty-first
century.2 The Committee's efforts, under the leadership of James B. Zimpritch,
Esq., widely acknowledged as the "Dean" of Maine's corporate bar, resulted in a
new Maine Business Corporation Act, codified in Title 13-C of the Maine Revised
Statutes (the New Act), taking effect on July 1, 2003 and replacing Title 13-A of
the Maine Revised Statutes (the Prior Act).3
While operating under the Prior Act, practitioners, judges and scholars in the
State of Maine had come to rely heavily on the first edition of Zimpritch's Maine
Corporation Law & Practice4 (Zimpritch, 1st. ed.) as the primary authority on the
Prior Act. Zimpritch, 1st ed. served both as a practical user's guide for the occa-
sional corporate law practitioner and as a source of thorough and scholarly discus-
sion of the finer points of Maine's corporate law for those practitioners and aca-
demics who considered corporate law their familiar waters, but who nevertheless
appreciated a reliable navigational aid when the fog descended or when exploring
an unfamiliar cove in an otherwise familiar bay.
1. JAMES B. ZIMPRITCH, MAINE CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE
(2ND ED., 2004)
While much of the New Act has the look and feel of the Prior Act, in the
process of refining and adding flexibility to Maine's traditional corporate law con-
1. MODEL Bus. CoRn'. ACT (3d. ed. 1998, Supp. 2000/01/02).
2. Rewriting Maine's Business Corporation Act 17 ME. B. J. 40, 41 (Maine State Bar Asso-
ciation 2002).
3. P.L. 2002, ch. 640. Subsequently, P.L. 2003, ch. 344 was enacted making several house-
keeping, conforming changes, and other amendments to the New Act. P.L. 2003, ch. 344 was
also effective on July 1, 2003. The second edition of Zimpritch's Maine Corporation Law &
Practice is current through the 2004 changes to the Maine Business Corporation Act, and supple-
ments are planned to keep the treatise current. JAMES B. ZIMPRITCH, MAINE CORPORATION LAW &
PRACTICE (Tower Publishing, 2d ed. 2004) (1993) [hereinafter ZIMPRITCH, 2d ed.].
4. JAMES B. ZIMPRITCH, MAINE CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE (Prentice Hall Law & Business
1993).
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cepts and principles, many fundamental changes were adopted, and several impor-
tant differences have surfaced between the New Act and the Prior Act--differ-
ences that create new opportunities, ambiguities, and traps for the unwary. Thus,
the notion of sailing among the rocks and shoals of the harbors and bays presented
by the New Act without a second edition of the Zimpritch book close at hand was
unthinkable among members of the Maine corporate bar. It was not until Zimpritch's
2nd Edition of Maine Corporation Law & Practice5 (Zimpritch, 2nd ed.) became
available in late 2004 that Maine corporate practitioners were armed with state-of-
the-art instruments necessary to fathom the nuances of the New Act and take ad-
vantage of its many new opportunities.
Zimpritch's concise style and organizational approach are clearly geared to
meet the needs of the general practitioner while at the same time satisfying the
sometimes more complex needs of the corporate bar, legal scholars, or the judi-
ciary. The treatise is organized into seventeen chapters corresponding to each
chapter of the New Act, followed by a final chapter covering the Revised Maine
Securities Act.6 In each chapter Zimpritch lucidly explains the statute and case
law, identifies both evident and more obscure legal issues, occasionally offers his
own valued opinion, and provides detailed footnotes loaded with citations and
commentary pointing the reader to additional resources for further insight into
particular issues. Because Maine is not a bastion of corporate law and corporate
litigation, the abundant information in the footnotes, pointing the reader to more
fertile ground, is at least as important and rewarding to the reader as the text itself.
Zimpritch provides numerous references to the Model Act and its official com-
mentary, which is continuously updated by the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws. One hopes that Maine corporate law under the New
Act will benefit by its reliance on the Model Act, which has been adopted in over
half of the states 7 and is thought to represent the state-of-the-art in corporate law.
I. ZIMPR1TCH, 2ND EDITION AS A TOOL FOR COUNSELORS TO
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
A comprehensive discussion of Zimpritch, 2nd ed. and the New Act is beyond
the scope of this book review. However, much of a corporate lawyer's time and
5. ZIMPRITCi, 2d ed., supra note 3.
6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10101-10713 (West 1999 and Supp. 2004).
7. All or substantially all of the provisions of the Model Act have been adopted in 26 states.
See state corporation statutes beginning at the following citations: ALA. CODE § 10-2B- 1.01 (2004);
ARIz. REv. STAT. § 10-120 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-101 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-600 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0101 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
101 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-101 (West 2005); IND. CODEANN. § 23-1-17-1 (West 2005);
IOWA CODE § 490.101 (2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.1-010 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-C § 101 (West 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-1.01 (2005); MONT. CODEANN. § 35-
1-112 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2001 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 239-A:1.01 (2005);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-01 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.001 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-101
(2005) (effective July 1, 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-1-101 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-11-
101 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-1Oa-101 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit llA § 1.01 (2005); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.01.010 (2005); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.0101 (2005); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-101 (West 2005). Five jurisdictions have adopted
their corporate statutes based on the 1969 version of the Model Act. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.01.005
(West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.01 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-1 (2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-11-I (West 2005); S.D. CODFIED LAWS § 47-1 (West 2005).
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skill should be devoted to properly structuring corporations and the relationship
among their stakeholders 8 at the formative stage. Capable corporate lawyers should
customize articles of incorporation, bylaws, and shareholder agreements to the
specific needs of the stakeholders, rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all boilerplate
approach. Under the New Act, new concepts of corporate finance and increased
flexibility in "private ordering" permitted in shareholder agreements provide cor-
porate practitioners with more opportunities, and arguably more responsibility, to
properly customize (and oftentimes dramatically simplify) closely held corporate
organizational documents to address precisely the circumstances and needs of the
entity's stakeholders. Most general practitioners with a significant closely held
corporate component to their practice will find that Chapters 6 (Corporate Finance),
7 (Shareholders), and 8 (Directors and Officers) of the treatise contain the most
important information and advice with respect to the proper formation of new closely
held corporations. 9
A. Increased Flexibility in Corporate Finance
Zimpritch intelligibly and thoughtfully introduces the many changes adopted
under the New Act with respect to corporate finance. The Committee sought to
modernize this section of the Maine corporation statute and increase the flexibility
afforded to small business corporations in this area. In doing so, it proposed adop-
tion of sections 601 and 602 of the New Act, which allow the board of directors of
a corporation to create partnership-like attributes for a corporation's shares. Prac-
titioners should use this flexibility to tailor the rights and preferences of shares to
the specific needs of their corporate client. Section 601 of the New Act, inter alia,
eliminates the traditional rule that shares within a single class of stock must be
treated equally and allows for variation among holders of the same class of stock
as long as it is set forth in the articles of incorporation. 10 Zimpritch offers a com-
8. The Authors use the word "stakeholders" to refer not only to stockholders, but also to
holders of other securities issued by the corporation, as well as directors, officers, agents, em-
ployees, and others with an economic interest or governance role in the enterprise.
9. ZIMPRITCH, 2nd ed., supra note 3. Closely-held corporations are quite different from large
corporations, and the thoughtful practitioner should draft corporate documents with these differ-
ences in mind.
[From the perspective of] the majority of academics who identify themselves as cor-
porate law scholars ... corporate law is really the law of the megafirm characterized
by passive owners who hold diversified portfolios and whose risk is defined by the
amount invested in each stock within the portfolio. For publicly-held firms, law's
efforts are directed to issues of governance and management accountability. At least
in theory, most partnerships and close corporations share the common characteristics
of owners who are small enough in numbers to be capable of private ordering through
contract. Their investments in their firms often are substantial, nondiversified, and
illiquid. The exit option provided by securities markets serving shareholders in pub-
licly-held firms is not available, with the consequence that disgruntled shareholders
in close corporations must suffer their unhappy circumstances for extended periods of
time. Moreover, these owners may invest their energy as well as their money, and a
quick glance at a balance sheet to assess capital contributions provides only a small
measure of what they have invested in their firms.
Robert W. Hillman, THE BARGAIN IN THE FIRm: PARTNERSHIP LAW, CORPORATE LAW, AND PRIVATE
ORDERINo WITHIN CLOSELY-HELo BUSINESS AssociAnoNs (2004), Section IV, available at http://
home.law.uiuc.edu/-ribstein/Hillman.doc.
10. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 601(5) (West 2005).
[Vol. 57:2
prehensive discussion of some circumstances under which a corporation can uti-
lize disparate treatment of shares to the advantage of minority shareholders to pro-
tect their interests from a hostile takeover. 1 1 Furthermore, section 622 of the New
Act reverses a troublesome provision of the Prior Act by allowing future consider-
ation, such as future services or investor promissory notes, to be accepted as pay-
ment for the issuance of shares. 12
The combined effect of these two changes would allow the issuance of shares
withiri a single class of stock to a passive financial investor and an individual
active in the business who receives shares by virtue of her commitment to perform
future services. That class of shares could nevertheless provide that shareholders
who contribute money for shares would be entitled to a priority return on their
investment through dividend or profit distributions ahead of shareholders who com-
mitted to perform services for shares. 13
As one commentator states, "Section [6011 sanctions, even invites, unlimited
creativity in designing forms of equity investment to meet investment needs." 14
Subsection 3 authorizes one or more series or classes of stock that (1) have special,
conditional or limited voting rights or no right to vote (subject to statutory voting
requirements); (2) are redeemable or convertible under several different circum-
stances; (3) are entitled to distributions calculated in any manner; or (4) have dis-
tribution preferences over other classes or series of stock. 15 Section 601(3) is not
intended to be an exclusive listing of the characteristics that may be attributed to
shares of a corporation. 16 Practitioners must be cognizant, however, that a de-
tailed description of the rights associated with various series or classes of shares
must be included in the articles of incorporation. 17
B. New Options for Private Ordering and ShareholderAgreements
In section 7.14, Zimpritch discusses private ordering and shareholder agree-
ments under section 743 of the New Act 18 and explains the tremendous flexibility
available under the New Act for structuring closely-held corporations. Zimpritch
offers a comprehensive historical look at the development of the shareholder agree-
ment leading up to the adoption of section 743.19 Practitioners would be wise to
familiarize themselves with the contents of this section and should strive to utilize
all that the New Act has to offer for the benefit of their clients. Section 743 allows
closely-held corporations to create a "'private order' that is otherwise inconsistent
with" traditional notions of corporate governance, thereby allowing small corpo-
rations to tailor their business practices to their specific needs.20
11. ZIMPRrrcH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 6.3[c].
12. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 622(2) (West 2005).
13. Of course practitioners would need to be mindful of the tax implications of such an
arrangement, such as the limitation of not more than one class of stock for an S corporation.
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (West 2002).
14. Bayless Manning, Assets in and Assets out: Chapter VI of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1527, 1531 (1985).
15. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 601(3) (West 2005).
16. Id.
17. ZiMpRrrcH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 6.3[a].
18. Id. § 7.14.
19. Id. § 7.14[a], at 186-87.
20. Id. at 186.
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Small business owners often seek the advice of counsel initially for assistance
in determining whether it is in the best interests of the company to organize as a
corporate entity. Initial consultation frequently involves discussion as to the choices
of entities available to business owners and the advantages and disadvantages of
each as they pertain to the needs and desires of the particular client. Small busi-
ness owners and practitioners alike may be reluctant to opt for a corporate form
because of the perceived rigidity that comes with corporate governance and may
instead tend to lean towards the LLC form because of the flexibility that an operat-
ing agreement affords the company. The ability to create a private-order corpora-
tion means "shareholders will have greater freedom to 'tailor the rules of their
enterprise' to their needs, [and may rely on the fact] that such private ordering will
be upheld by the courts." '2 1
Section 743 of the New Act allows shareholders of closely-held corporations
to adopt governance procedures that are otherwise inconsistent with customary
corporate concepts found in other provisions of the New Act. 22 Shareholders may
elect to establish their own governance procedures without regard to otherwise
applicable governance provisions of the New Act. Shareholder agreements that
comply with section 743 are provided a "safe harbor" and will be effective even
though they otherwise buck the traditional rules of corporate governance, pro-
vided they are not contrary to public policy. Section 743 sets forth seven catego-
ries of shareholder agreements that are authorized and effective under the New Act
and that enable shareholders of closely-held corporations to enjoy the benefits of
the limited liability inherent in a corporation while maintaining the simplicity and
flexibility of an informal partnership or a LLC.23
21. Report of Department of the Secretary of State and Corporate Law Revision Committee
to the Judiciary Committee: Summary of L.D. 361, An Act to Adopt the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act in Maine (Nov. 14, 2001), reprinted in ZMPRrrCH, 2d ed., supra note 3, app. A, at A-
11; and in Rewriting Maine's Business Corporation Act, supra note 2, at 43.
22. ZIMPtrrcH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 7.14[c], at 188.
23. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 743(1) (West 2005). Section 743 provides:
An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies with this sec-
tion is effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is incon-
sistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it:
A. Eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of the
board of directors;
B. Governs the authorization or making of distributions whether or not in pro-
portion to ownership of shares, subject to the limitations in section 651;
C. Establishes who are directors or officers of the corporation or their terms of
office or manner of selection or removal;
D. Governs, in general or in regard to specific matters, the exercise or division
of voting power by or between the shareholders and directors or by or among
any of them, including use of weighted voting rights or director proxies;
E. Establishes the terms and conditions of any agreement for the transfer or use
of property or the provision of services between the corporation and any share-
holder, director, officer or employee of the corporation or among any of them;
F. Transfers to one or more shareholders or other persons all or part of the
authority to exercise the corporate powers or to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation, including the resolution of any issue about which there ex-
ists a deadlock among directors or shareholders;
G. Requires dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or more of the
shareholders or upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency; or
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Zimpritch clearly and concisely articulates the expansiveness of these catego-
ries in Section 7.14[c] [ii] by explaining, inter alia, that shareholder agreements of
closely-held corporations can be drafted to eliminate or reallocate the discretion of
the board or directors; authorize distributions that are not in proportion to share
ownership; alter the manner in which directors are elected; restructure voting rights
of shareholders and directors; or alter the manner in which business affairs are
managed. 24 Additionally, a catch-all provision validates shareholder agreements
which "[o]therwise [govern] the exercise of the corporate powers or the manage-
ment of the business and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among the
shareholders, the directors and the corporation or among any of them, and is not
contrary to public policy."25
The "contrary to public policy" language serves as a signal that section 743 is
not unlimited in its scope and practitioners are warned that "[t]hose relying on
[section 743(l)(H)] should proceed with caution as it is likely that the courts, not
the [New] Act or the official comments, will determine the enforceability of ar-
rangements" premised on the apparent breadth of section 743(l)(H).26
In addition to the breadth of section 743, closely-held corporations can take
advantage of the flexibility provided by section 743 with relative ease. Relaxed
formal requirements are easy to comply with and only demand that a written agree-
ment exists among the shareholders. 27 Any shareholder agreement seeking the
validation protection of section 743 must be signed by all shareholders at the time
of adoption and may only be amended by unanimous shareholder consent, unless
the agreement itself provides that amendments may be made by consent of less
than all of the shareholders. 28 Notice of a shareholder agreement under section
743 is afforded to third parties by requiring that share certificates bear a legend
indicating that the shares are subject to a shareholder agreement or that the infor-
mation statement sent in lieu of certificates contains this disclosure. 29
It is important that a section 743 private ordering arrangement set forth in the
corporation's bylaws or a separate shareholder agreement adopted by all share-
H. Otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers or the management
of the business and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among the
shareholders, the directors and the corporation, or among any of them, and is
not contrary to public policy.
Id.
24. ZLMPRrrcH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 7.14[c][ii].
25. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, §743(1)(H) (West 2005).
26. Michael E. High, Shareholders, in MAINE'S NEW CORORATE LAW: EXPLORING NEW TECH-
NIQUES, AVOIDING DANGEROUS TRAPS 39, 42 (Maine State Bar Ass'n Continuing Legal Education
2003). High also suggests that practitioners exercise caution in the following areas that may
prove to be a violation of public policy and thereby an unenforceable provision of a shareholder
agreement under section 743: (1) waiver of a shareholder's right to inspect corporate records;
(2) waiver of a shareholder's right to bring a derivative suit; (3) waiver of a shareholder's
dissenter's rights; and (4) waiver of a shareholder's right to seek dissolution for waste of corpo-
rate assets. Id. at 47-48.
27. ME. REV. STAT. ArNN. tit. 13-C, § 743(2)(A)(2) (West 2005).
28. Id. § 743(2)(B).
29. Id. § 743(3). Section 743(3) also provides that, notwithstanding whether a share certifi-
cate in fact contains the required legend, transferees of the shares will be bound by the terms of
the shareholder agreement. Id. However, purchasers of shares subject to a shareholder agree-
ment who did not have knowledge of the existence of such an agreement are entitled to rescind
their purchase. Id.
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holders at the time of its adoption and meeting the other requirements of the statute
is automatically binding on future shareholders and transferees of initial share-
holders. 30 Zimpritch offers an insightful discussion on the consideration given to
section 743's ability to bind unknowing transferees of stock to the terms of a share-
holder agreement. 3 1 Even if stock certificates are not properly legended, purchas-
ers who do not have actual or deemed knowledge of the arrangement are nonethe-
less bound by its terms, but they do have a right of rescission against the seller.32
The options for altering the traditional form of corporate governance provided
by section 743 appear to be limited only by public policy considerations and the
imagination of corporate counsel. A Maine corporation with only one individual
who wears the hats of sole shareholder, sole director, and president of the corpora-
tion should not be required to hold annual meetings for election of directors and
officers. The provisions of section 743 would allow this corporation to adopt a
shareholder agreement 33 that dispenses with the requirements of annual meetings
and issuance of stock certificates, and names the sole shareholder as director and
president until his/her resignation. One commentator suggests that section 743
may even allow a corporation to dispense with the requirement of corporate by-
laws or maintenance of certain corporate records.34 Adoption of this type of share-
holder agreement should not expose the shareholder to increased risk of piercing
the corporate veil because such an individual is expressly afforded the protection
of section 743(6), which provides:
The existence or performance of an agreement authorized by this section is not a
ground for imposing personal liability on any shareholder for the acts or debts of
the corporation even if the agreement or its performance treats the corporation as
if it were a partnership or results in failure to observe the corporate formalities
otherwise applicable to the matters governed by the agreement. 35
The flexibility afforded by section 743, along with the express protection against
piercing the corporate veil for failure to observe corporate formalities, is a major
departure from traditional corporate law and an opportunity that should not be
overlooked by practitioners. Corporate practitioners who fail to become intimately
familiar with section 743 and the wide range of flexibility it offers, are likely to
miss out on important opportunities available to their clients.
C. Important Changes and Clarification to the Director Liability Provisions
A second critical section in both the New Act and in Zimpritch, 2d ed. relates
to the liabilities imposed on a corporation's directors. A director of a corporation
owes a duty to the corporation when he/she is involved in decision-making on
behalf of the corporation or oversight of corporate matters. 36 The duty of loyalty
30. See id.
31. ZIMP ,trcH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 7.14[e].
32. Id. Arguably, establishing all of the customary terms of a shareholder transfer restriction
and buy-sell agreement in a private ordering arrangement as part of the bylaws of the corpora-
tion could reduce or eliminate the need to follow the traditional and sometimes difficult or
impossible precautionary approach of obtaining the signatures of spouses of shareholders in
shareholder agreements.
33. A shareholder agreement may exist even if there is only one shareholder. Id. § 7.14[d].
34. High, supra note 26, at 44-45.
35. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 743(6) (West 2005).
36. ZIMPRITCH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 8.7[b][i].
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owed by a director to the corporation has largely developed through common law
and is discussed in depth in section 8.7[c][i] of Zimpritch, 2d ed. The New Act
attempts to codify two facets of the duty of loyalty by requiring that a director act
"[i]n good faith... and [i]n a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation."' 37 Section 831(2) of the New Act sets forth the
duty of care owed by a director as "care that a person in a like position would
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances. ' 38
A far-reaching provision in the New Act is section 202(2)(D), which drasti-
cally limits the circumstances under which a director can be held liable for his/her
actions or failure to act as a director. Section 202(2)(D) provides that the articles
of incorporation may include a provision that limits or eliminates the liability of a
director for breaches of duty to the corporation or to the shareholders except under
the reasons enumerated therein. 39 While section 202(2)(D) affords broad protec-
tion to directors, Zimpritch accurately notes that section 202(2)(D) does have limi-
tations in its application. 40 The protection afforded by section 202(2)(D) is lim-
ited to breaches of duty to the corporation or the shareholders and is inapplicable
for liability owed to third parties and is also inapplicable to officers.4 1
Exceptions to the liability protection in section 202(2)(D) provide that a di-
rector cannot escape liability for "financial benefit[s] received by a director to
which the director is not entitled; an intentional infliction of harm on the corpora-
tion or its shareholders; ... a violation of section 833 [liability for unlawful distri-
butions]; or ... [a]n intentional violation of criminal law."42 The Committee
recommended that the articles of incorporation form published by the office of the
Secretary of State include a "check the box" format allowing corporations to opt-
in for the protections afforded by section 202(2)(D).43 The Secretary of State ulti-
mately adopted this recommendation and it is now very easy for corporations to
take advantage of this section. 44 Zimpritch cautions the corporate practitioner,
however, that "[while likely to be elected in most circumstances, it may not be the
ideal election in every case, and the incorporator(s) should carefully consider the
ramifications of the election."'45
A second check-the-box election on the standard Maine articles of incorpora-
tion form with respect to director liability available in the articles of incorporation
is an election for mandatory indemnification of directors and officers. The New
Act permits indemnification of a director if his/her conduct was made in good faith
and the director reasonably believed it to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. 46 Additionally, section 852 allows broader indemnification to be "made per-
37. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 831(1) (West 2005).
38. Id. § 831(2).
39. Id. § 202(2)(D).
40. ZIMPRITCH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 2.3[b] [iii].
41. Id.
42. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 202(2)(D) (West 2005). A similar standard is set for
indemnification of corporate officers in section 857(1). Id. § 857(1).
43. Gregory S. Fryer, Directors and Officers: Duties and Liabilities, in MAIN's NEW CORPO-
PorTE LAW, supra note 26, at 86.
44. The form adopted by the Maine Secretary of State for articles of incorporation is avail-
able at http://www.maine.gov/sos/Cec/corp/.
45. ZimpRircH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 2.3[b][iii].
46. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 852(1) (West 2005).
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missible or obligatory" under the articles of incorporation.47 Zimpritch explains
that the ramifications of electing expanded indemnification for officers and direc-
tors include a shifting of the burden to the corporation to establish
that a director or officer is not entitled to indemnification or advances because
one of the four exceptions applies, whereas under the general indemnification
provisions of the Act, the director or officer has the burden of establishing his
good faith and reasonable belief regarding best interest of the corporation ... and
[the provisions of] the Articles of Incorporation are more difficult to amend, re-
quiring shareholder approval, and hence provide greater certainty to directors
and officers. 4 8
Although counselors of closely held corporations will usually take advantage
of the broadest possible exculpatory and indemnity provisions under the New Act,
they should not do so without first considering the perspective of their clients in
the specific stakeholder environment at hand. For example, imagine the counselor
for a passive investor shareholder in a closely held corporation. The broadest
possible exculpation and indemnity might not be in the best interest of that inves-
tor. A passive investor might prefer that a director seeking indemnification, rather
than the corporation, have the burden of establishing that his conduct meets the
applicable standards in the New Act. Furthermore, under the New Act, a provision
requiring indemnification to the fullest extent of the law is deemed to obligate the
corporation to advance expenses as well, unless otherwise specifically provided.
Finally, under a private ordering arrangement pursuant to Section 743, it would be
possible to fashion customized performance standards for one or more directors
and/or officers (in which very specific performance standards, and consequences
for failure to meet those standards, tailored to the specific business objectives of
the closely held corporation are adopted), and the careful counselor would not
want to nullify the effectiveness of those contractual standards by casually adopt-
ing the New Act's broadest exculpatory and indemnity provisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Zimpritch, 2d ed. is now and will continue to serve as an excellent resource
for corporate practitioners and members of the judiciary for questions both simple
and complex regarding the New Act. Zimpritch has done a tremendous service to
members of the Maine Bar in offering his knowledge and expertise in corporate
law matters to his colleagues. Maine corporate practitioners would be further ben-
efited by a more in-depth discussion of the possible uses of section 743 to create
private-ordering for closely-held corporations with corresponding sample forms,
and the nuances to be considered in determining whether or not to take advantage
of the director indemnification available under section 202(2)(D) in future edi-
tions of the Zimpritch treatise.
Chapters 6 (Corporate Finance), 7 (Shareholders), and 8 (Directors and Offic-
ers) of the New Act provide corporate counselors with new and improved tools for
properly customizing and structuring the organizational documents of new corpo-
rations to fit the specific needs and priorities of their clients. Counselors now have
47. Id. See also FRYER, supra note 43, at 97.
48. ZIMPRITCH, 2d ed., supra note 3, § 2.3[b][iv].
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a heightened responsibility to understand and properly utilize these statutory op-
portunities and to avoid some associated rocks and shoals. As has been the case
with the first edition of Zimpritch under the Prior Act, the second edition of
Zimpritch is "required equipment" for those sailing in the new harbors and coves
of the New Act. In the closely held corporate context, one hopes that Zimpritch
will give practitioners the requisite confidence to fashion specific contractual and
partnership-like concepts that take advantage of the corporate finance, private or-
dering, and director/officer liability provisions of the New Act, rather than casu-
ally adopting form bylaws and shareholder agreements with customary and tradi-
tional corporate concepts. Including in the articles of incorporation and bylaws
those concepts formerly found in a separate shareholders agreement should be the
rule rather than the exception under the New Act. This approach will most con-
cisely and effectively take full advantage of private ordering opportunities, much
the same way members of limited liability companies package their rights and
obligations in articles of organization and operating agreements.49
49. See, e.g., Michael B. Peisner, Forms for Flexible Entities: LLC Agreements with Corpo-
rate Characteristics and By-Laws with LLC Characteristics, in BUSINESS LAw INSTUTE, 169
(Maine State Bar Ass'n Continuing Legal Education 2004).
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